UPDATE: JAN 25, 2012: PATRIOT COALITION / OATH KEEPERS NDAA RESOLUTIONS RELEASED!
AVAILABLE NOW AT THE PATRIOT COALITION SITE:
http://patriotcoalition.com/docs/NDAA-OK-RES.pdf
http://patriotcoalition.com/docs/NDAA-SHERIFF-RES.pdf
AVAILABLE LATER TODAY AT THE OATH KEEPERS WEBSITE:
http://oathkeepers.org/ndaa/NDAA-OK-RES.pdf
http://oathkeepers.org/ndaa/NDAA-SHERIFF-RES.pdf
December 15, 2011 was the 220th Anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Yesterday was also the day the U.S. Senate approved the death certificate for the Bill of Rights, by a 86-13 vote.
Earlier in the week, 283 Congressmen approved the death certificate on due process when they approved the conference report. The National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540 / S. 1867) still awaits the signature of the Constitutional Coroner-in-Chief.
UPDATE: JAN 02, 2012
On New Year's Eve, our Constitutional Coroner-in-Chief signed the un-Constitutional NDAA into law. President Obama, like Senators McCain, Graham, Levin, Feinstein, Durbin, and others, has played fancy with words, betrayed his oath of office, and committed "treason against the Constitution."
You can read President Obama's "confession" here, which includes his admission that he will IGNORE the parts of the law he doesn't agree with as "non-binding."
You can read the H.R. 1540/S. 1867 conference report here. You can also find the illusive "Law of War Handbook" here.
The Feinstein Amendment, (1546) from page 655 of the conference report reads:
14 (e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be
15 construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to
16 the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident
17 aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are
18 captured or arrested in the United States.
While this sounds like a protection for U.S. citizens and lawful residents, this amendment did NOTHING of the sort. It only speaks to "existing law or authorities," to detain, without due process, U.S. citizens, lawful resident aliens, or other persons captured or arrested in the United States.
THERE IS NO EXISTING LAW OR AUTHORITY that passes a Constitutional muster for Mrs. Feinstein's amendment to be applied. The "existing authority" was/is that usurped by Presidents Bush (43) and Obama. Congress couldn't even agree what the relevant "existing law or authority" was, if one existed. The ambiguous "law of war" is repeatedly cited in this legislation without so much as a vague citation, let alone a specific article/section/clause reference.
Senator Lindsey Graham stated on the U.S. Senate floor that "America is part of the battlefield," in his defense of Section 1031 in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1867.
If America is "part of the battlefield" in the nefarious 'war on terror,' then no civil liberties or constitutionally-protected God-given Rights are safe from military and police state activities.
In this police-state environment, ALL Americans became potential domestic terrorists, subject to indefinite detention, devoid of the due process protections of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;"
Notice it doesn't say "no U.S. Citizen or lawful resident alien." It says "No person." That includes ax murderers, rapists, serial killers, traitors, etc... It applies to ALL persons in the United States, and while the Supreme Court has found it to be Constitutional to detain U.S. citizens found on the battlefield abroad to fall under the 'law of war,' they did not rule that such a condition existed for U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens on U.S. soil.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the case referred to by Senator Levin to validate his position that Section 1031 was/is constitutional, referred to the disposition of a U.S. citizen found on the 'battlefield' in Afghanistan, and detained without due process for two years.
Supreme Court Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, stated,
"Petitioner, a presumed American citizen, has been imprisoned without charge or hearing in the Norfolk and Charleston Naval Brigs for more than two years, on the allegation that he is an enemy combatant who bore arms against his country for the Taliban. His father claims to the contrary, that he is an inexperienced aid worker caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. This case brings into conflict the competing demands of national security and our citizens’ constitutional right to personal liberty. Although I share the Court’s evident unease as
it seeks to reconcile the two, I do not agree with its
resolution.
Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime. Where the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 2, allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge. No one contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision below."
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion should be read in its entirety, but I find section V to be most interesting. It reads:
It follows from what I have said that Hamdi is entitled to a habeas decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus. A suspension of the writ could, of course, lay down conditions for continued detention, similar to those that today’s opinion prescribes under the Due Process Clause. Cf. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755. But there is a world of difference between the people’s representatives’ determining the need for that suspension (and prescribing the conditions for it), and this Court’s doing so.
The plurality finds justification for Hamdi’s imprisonment in the Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, which provides:
“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” §2(a).
This is not remotely a congressional suspension of the writ, and no one claims that it is. Contrary to the plurality’s view, I do not think this statute even authorizes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid grave constitutional concerns, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); with the clarity necessary to comport with cases such as Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944), and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314—316, 324 (1946); or with the clarity necessary to overcome the statutory prescription that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).5 But even if it did, I would not permit it to overcome Hamdi’s entitlement to habeas corpus relief. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which carefully circumscribes the conditions under which the writ can be withheld, would be a sham if it could be evaded by congressional prescription of requirements other than the common-law requirement of committal for criminal prosecution that render the writ, though available, unavailing. If the Suspension Clause does not guarantee the citizen that he will either be tried or released, unless the conditions for suspending the writ exist and the grave action of suspending the writ has been taken; if it merely guarantees the citizen that he will not be detained unless Congress by ordinary legislation says he can be detained; it guarantees him very little indeed.
It should not be thought, however, that the plurality’s evisceration of the Suspension Clause augments, principally, the power of Congress. As usual, the major effect of its constitutional improvisation is to increase the power of the Court. Having found a congressional authorization for detention of citizens where none clearly exists; and having discarded the categorical procedural protection of the Suspension Clause; the plurality then proceeds, under the guise of the Due Process Clause, to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate. It “weigh[s] the private interest … against the Government’s asserted interest,” ante, at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted), and–just as though writing a new Constitution–comes up with an unheard-of system in which the citizen rather than the Government bears the burden of proof, testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and the presiding officer may well be a “neutral” military officer rather than judge and jury. See ante, at 26—27. It claims authority to engage in this sort of “judicious balancing” from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case involving … the withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue (and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.
Having distorted the Suspension Clause, the plurality finishes up by transmogrifying the Great Writ–disposing of the present habeas petition by remanding for the District Court to “engag[e] in a factfinding process that is both prudent and incremental,” ante, at 32. “In the absence of [the Executive’s prior provision of procedures that satisfy due process], … a court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.” Ante, at 31—32. This judicial remediation of executive default is unheard of. The role of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of executive detention, not to supply the omitted process necessary to make it legal. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and … the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”); 1 Blackstone 132—133. It is not the habeas court’s function to make illegal detention legal by supplying a process that the Government could have provided, but chose not to. If Hamdi is being imprisoned in violation of the Constitution (because without due process of law), then his habeas petition should be granted; the Executive may then hand him over to the criminal authorities, whose detention for the purpose of prosecution will be lawful, or else must release him.
There is a certain harmony of approach in the plurality’s making up for Congress’s failure to invoke the Suspension Clause and its making up for the Executive’s failure to apply what it says are needed procedures–an approach that reflects what might be called a Mr. Fix-it Mentality. The plurality seems to view it as its mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the consequences, as far as individual rights are concerned, of the other two branches’ actions and omissions. Has the Legislature failed to suspend the writ in the current dire emergency? Well, we will remedy that failure by prescribing the reasonable conditions that a suspension should have included. And has the Executive failed to live up to those reasonable conditions? Well, we will ourselves make that failure good, so that this dangerous fellow (if he is dangerous) need not be set free. The problem with this approach is not only that it steps out of the courts’ modest and limited role in a democratic society; but that by repeatedly doing what it thinks the political branches ought to do it encourages their lassitude and saps the vitality of government by the people.
There will be more information on this from the Patriot Coalition, but in the mean time, you can also learn more about this threat to the Bill of Rights in the following articles from the Oath Keepers:
Solving the Puzzle of Enemy Combatant Status - Stewart Rhodes
Enemy Combatant Status No More
Stop Indefinite Detentions of U.S. Citizens without Due Process
(Congressman Ron Paul's Position Below)
"Little by little, in the name of fighting terrorism, our Bill of Rights is being repealed. The 4th amendment has been rendered toothless by the PATRIOT Act. No more can we truly feel secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects when now there is an exception that fits nearly any excuse for our government to search and seize our property. Of course, the vast majority of Americans may say “I’m not a terrorist, so I have no reason to worry.” However, innocent people are wrongly accused all the time. The Bill of Rights is there precisely because the founders wanted to set a very high bar for the government to overcome in order to deprive an individual of life or liberty. To lower that bar is to endanger everyone. When the bar is low enough to include political enemies, our descent into totalitarianism is virtually assured.
The PATRIOT Act, as bad is its violation of the 4th Amendment, was just one step down the slippery slope. The recently passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) continues that slip toward tyranny and in fact accelerates it significantly. The main section of concern, Section 1021 of the NDAA Conference Report, does to the 5th Amendment what the PATRIOT Act does to the 4th. The 5th Amendment is about much more than the right to remain silent in the face of government questioning. It contains very basic and very critical stipulations about due process of law. The government cannot imprison a person for no reason and with no evidence presented or access to legal counsel." (Read Rep. Paul's complete statement below)
The NDAA Repeals More Rights, Congressman Ron Paul
FROM NATURAL NEWS:
Myth busted: Yes, the NDAA does apply to Americans, and here's the text that says so
ADDITIONAL NDAA REFEERNCE MATERIALS:
LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE
TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES" IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
AUTHORIZATION FOR US OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS
Subscribe